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Abstract
This article examines social shareholder advocacy and socially responsible investing (SRI) to
better understand the marketization of activism and the intersection of business and social
justice. We use archival, interview, and participant observation data to explore how social
shareholder activism has increasingly come to be practiced for profit. We show how the
movement’s history in social justice activism of the 1960s and 1970s continues to shape the
practice today, even while it is increasingly commodified, marketized, and shaped by the ideals
and practices of business and finance. Shareholder activists and other SRI advocates have created
a new market and a hybrid form of investing that melds social and environmental concerns
with financial profit. However, as the fundamental principles of capital accumulation remain
unaltered, these practitioners find themselves pulled and pushed between the competing logics
of activist ideals and investment finance.
Keywords
social movements, shareholder activism, responsible investing, institutional logics
On an October day in 2012, an audience of mostly investment advisors attending an annual
Conference on Socially Responsible Investing (SRI)1 at the Mohegan Sun Resort and Casino
gathered for a talk titled, “SRI from Underground to the Penthouse Suite: Have Our Principles
Shrunk As Our Assets Have Increased?” According to the conference program, this was a rare
opportunity to “hear . . . the Industry Pioneer Robert Zevin, describe the changes in the SRI movement he has seen in the past 45 years of his career . . . As we have won more mainstream clients
and adherents, has our focus on challenging wrongs in the current system diminished?” Zevin
explained that early on “we called ourselves a movement”—alongside the environmental, women’s rights, and civil rights movements—while now, “we think of ourselves as an industry.”
This example of the responsible investing/shareholder activism movement illustrates a specific type of social movement consequence, namely, the marketization of movement ideas and
practices. Researchers interested in social movement outcomes have typically examined how
movements affect changes in government policy, contribute to cultural shifts, and alter the lives
of activists (see Snow and Soule 2010). However, recently there is increased interest in the effects
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of market forces on social movements and philanthropy (see, for example, Dauvergne and
LeBaron 2014; King 2006; Nickel and Eikenberry 2009; Tokar 1997) and the marketization or/
and corporatization of movement ideas and practices (see Jaffee and Howard 2010; Soederberg
2009).2 For movements advocating social and environmental justice, marketization creates serious tensions as the profit imperative competes with movement ideals. We use the case of shareholder activism and SRI to explore such tensions and their consequences. We argue that, up till
now at least, longtime SRI practitioners in for-profit companies have, for the most part, been able
to retain a fair amount of their social justice agenda, even while operating in a profit-oriented
environment.
Shareholder activism occurs when socially concerned investors use their equity positions to
call for increased transparency, better reporting, or, in some instances, policy changes in corporations. Shareholder activists lobby corporate leaders and seek changes in corporate behavior by
working through existing legal structures to modify, rather than radically challenge, corporate
structures and practices. Min-Dong Paul Lee and Michael Lounsbury (2011:159) argue that
shareholder activism is “a unique form of social movement activism that seeks changes in corporate social behavior.” It is different from other social movement activism, in that most participants are investors in the companies they seek to change; for this reason, some call shareholder
activism an “insider tactic” (Soule 2009). “Social shareholder activism” focuses mainly on social
and environmental issues and is thus distinguished from similar actions driven solely by financial
motivations (Lee and Lounsbury 2011).3 It can include letter-writing campaigns, divestment,
dialogue with corporate leaders, and shareholder resolutions, whereby shareowners submit a
proposal to be voted on, usually by proxy ballot, at the company’s annual meeting.
Shareholder activism is a social change endeavor that is increasingly practiced for profit by
responsible investment firms. In the 1960s and 1970s, nonprofits and activists with low budgets
often leveraged borrowed or donated shares to file shareholder resolutions. Whereas some noninvestor activists still participate, the field has grown and become more sophisticated as for-profit
and other professional organizations have come to dominate. Since the 1990s, institutional investors such as pension funds and union groups (see Marens 2008) play a larger role. SRI firms, such
as Calvert or Domini, and pension funds are now the most visible players (Welsh and Passoff
2012). Meanwhile, larger financial corporations such as Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley
have begun to offer “responsible investment” products (now also called “ESG” (environmental,
social, and governance) or “impact” investing, based on the principle that taking social, environmental, and governance issues into account is good for companies’ financial bottom line).
As responsible investing and shareholder activism have come to be increasingly practiced by
for-profit firms, the logic of social justice activism intersects more and more with the logic of the
market. Patricia Thornton and William Ocasio (1999:101) explain that institutional logics consist
of “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs,
and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize their
time, and provide meaning to their social reality.” The logic of social justice and environmental
social change emphasizes redistribution of wealth, internalization of externalities, and other ideals that potentially threaten business profits. The logic of capital accumulation, by contrast,
emphasizes profits above all else.
Recent work by organizations scholars addresses what may happen when organizations (and
individuals in those organizations) are faced with competing logics (Battilana and Dorado 2010;
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury 2011; Pache and Santos 2010). Julie
Battilana and Silvia Dorado (2010), for example, compare how two different for-profit microlending institutions attempted to bridge the need for profit with a social justice-derived commitment to providing loans to very poor people. Greenwood et al. (2010:318) explain that “[t]o the
extent that the prescriptions and proscriptions of different logics are incompatible, or at least
appear to be so, they inevitably generate challenges and tensions for organizations exposed to
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them.” Yet despite such tensions, competing logics sometimes endure —one does not necessarily
win out over another (Greenwood et al. 2011).
Sociologists are generally in agreement that when social justice and market logics intersect,
social justice ideals and practices tend to be weakened (Jaffee 2012; Jaffee and Howard 2010;
Johnston 2008; Lounsbury 2005). Michael Lounsbury (2005) examines how recycling transitioned from a social movement concerned with community empowerment and environmental
protection to a technocratic profit-driven endeavor as large garbage-hauling firms received contracts from local governments to collect and process recyclables. In the case of recycling, very
little remains of the early social justice ideals (see also Pellow, Schnaiberg, and Weinberg 2000).
Daniel Jaffee (2012) shows how the fair trade movement has come to be increasingly dominated
by corporate actors that work to weaken fair trade standards. Similarly, organic agriculture began
as a social movement, the progressive wing of which hoped to achieve a more holistic way of
interacting with the land and a more equitable set of distribution practices. As corporations
entered the organics market, they sought to weaken the official definitions of organic to facilitate
participation at the industrial level (Guthman 2004). These cases exemplify ways in which market logics may come to dominate social justice-inspired endeavors. But are social justice logics,
though weakened, completely eclipsed? If not, how do at least some of the social-justice-inspired
ideas and practices originated by movement activists persist, even under market conditions? How
might conflicting logics of social justice and profit coexist?
What follows is an empirical study of how the shareholder activism/responsible investing
movement partially developed into an industry and the consequences of that evolution. We specifically investigate the question of whether and how the seemingly incompatible logics of social
justice and market/profit both persist in for-profit SRI firms and investigate how and why market
logic has not completely trumped social justice agendas. In doing so, we hope to further illuminate what may happen when movement activities become marketized and/or when movements
seek to use the market as a social change mechanism. A more complete understanding of the
processes at play when movements and markets intersect may facilitate theorizing of this phenomenon and may also allow movements to structure future projects so as to limit or avoid the
weakening of social justice components that often accompany marketization and corporatization
(Jaffee and Howard 2010).
By “marketization,” we refer to the growth in the number of for-profit SRI firms and SRI
products, and the entrance into the field of “responsible investing” by large and powerful players
such as Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America. Marketization is partially linked
with professionalization, by which we mean the growth in both nonprofit and for-profit organizations staffed by paid employees, the creation of courses of study in business schools, the routinization of typical forms of shareholder activism, and the growth of a small army of professionals—at
the Securities Exchange Commission, in companies, in consulting firms and elsewhere—that
deal with various social shareholder and investor demands. Although these processes are distinct,
they influence each other, as we will discuss below.
Although shaped by the imperatives of business and investment, social shareholder activism
and SRI continue to be partially shaped by the social justice/social change logic on which it was
founded. Shareholder activists and advocates of responsible investing have helped to create a
new market and a hybrid form of investing that melds social and environmental concerns with
financial profit, but the fundamental logic of capital accumulation persists, creating a tension
whereby responsible investing advocates seek profit on one hand and the internalization of “bad”
externalities on the other. With the creation and growth of for-profit SRI firms, shareholder activism/SRI has become a consumer product that is marketed to investors (consumers of financial
products) seeking to better align their social values with their financial decisions. We investigate
how what began as a fairly radical tactic for progressive causes became marketized and led to the
development of “hybrid”4 organizations that seek to merge social and environmental justice ideals with profit.
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Data and Method
Data for our study derive from 22 semistructured interviews with U.S.-based shareholder activists/practitioners that took place between 2009 and 2013; a participant observation at the Interfaith
Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) in fall 2009; attendance/participation at several
investment-related events5; examination of books, articles, and blogs by practitioners of shareholder advocacy; and reviews of numerous online sources, including websites of firms engaging
in shareholder activism. We also draw upon an array of secondary sources, mostly reports and
blogs by legal and business scholars.
Our interest in this topic sprang from the first author’s experience as a member of an institutional “responsible investment” committee, which was charged with defining proxy-voting
guidelines for shareholder resolutions. We wondered who was submitting these resolutions and
why. Upon discovering that social shareholder resolutions originated in the social movement
activism of the 1960s, we set out to learn more about the people involved and their interest in this
particular tactic.
The project began as a “field-driven” participant observation (Lichterman 2002) at the
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a nonprofit organization that unites faithbased and other concerned investors to work toward corporate social responsibility via responsible investment and shareholder advocacy. For two months in fall of 2009, the first author
volunteered one morning per week at ICCR’s office in New York City working on a project
(assigned by ICCR’s Director) to compile a list of companies offering SRI products. At this time,
semistructured interviews were conducted with five ICCR staff members suggested by the
Director because of their direct involvement with member organizations and/or with shareholder
activism specifically. The initial research goals were to understand the following: how the process worked (including who engaged in shareholder activism and responsible investing), how the
target companies and issues were identified, and what drew practitioners to the practice. Field
notes and interview data from this initial experience were coded to develop categories (Strauss
and Corbin 1998), at which point two significant shifts in the social movement were noted: (1)
the move toward more dialogue with companies (rather than just filing shareholder resolutions)
and (2) the increasing relevance of other, nonreligious entities (such as pension funds and SRI
firms).
Subsequently, we conducted 17 more semistructured interviews with key informants (Blee
and Taylor 2002) and other respondents selected to represent specific positions in the field. For
example, we made sure to interview practitioners from both for-profit and not-for-profit entities,
as well as lawyers who advise these entities on their resolutions. We do not use the names of the
people interviewed but instead refer to them as R1, R2, and so on (the appendix provides the job
description of each). Interviews lasted between half an hour and two hours; most were in-person,
though six were done via telephone. Shareholder activists of all persuasions (whether employees
of firms or volunteer activists) were incredibly generous with their time; four respondents were
interviewed more than once, and several corresponded with us subsequently via e-mail (to send
additional information or to answer follow-up questions). Interview transcriptions were coded
and triangulated with field notes and archival documents. Our process was iterative: As we recognized how the movement was increasingly shaped by business and how for-profit SRI practices were being shaped by movement ideals, we began to investigate that intersection more
specifically, and our last three interviews focused more on these questions.
In the following sections, we first provide a brief history, showing how social shareholder
activism began as a tactic used by left-leaning social movements and how a professional nonprofit organization soon became the major player in the emerging field. Meanwhile, for-profit
responsible investment firms were formed that grew in size and number slowly but surely in
subsequent decades. Next, we describe social shareholder activism as it is currently practiced and

King and Gish

715

how it is increasingly marketized. We then show how the logic of progressive social change
activism, on one hand, and the logic of business and finance, on the other, shape the ideas and
practices of SRI practitioners.

Shareholder Activism as Social Change Activism
Shareholder activists were early challengers of corporate power, pioneering the practice in the
1960s and early 1970s. Social shareholder activism has been used by, or ideologically linked to,
almost every major social movement, including civil rights, anti-Apartheid, feminism, GLBT
rights, and environmentalism.
Three distinct campaigns initially shaped this movement. First, in the mid-1960s, Saul Alinsky
and other activists, while working on a civil rights campaign in Rochester, New York, had the
idea to use shareholder power to pressure companies (Alinsky 1971). Borrowing shares of
Kodak, activists attended the company’s annual meeting to confront management on an array of
issues, including hiring and training practices. Alinsky’s ideas helped to spread the notion that
shareholders could use their position to influence corporate social and environmental practices.
Second, in 1968, the Medical Committee for Human Rights, a social justice organization, filed a
shareholder proposal with Dow Chemical demanding the company be prohibited from selling
napalm if the intended use was against human beings. Dow initially refused to put the resolution
on its proxy ballot, but a Court of Appeals ruling forced the company to allow the proposal, setting the legal precedent for allowing shareholder proposals that dealt with social, rather than
strictly financial, issues. Third, the Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible (Campaign
GM), a group concerned with civil rights and other progressive causes, filed nine proposals in
1970; two of these were upheld by the SEC (the government agency that rules on the legitimacy
of shareholder proposals) and allowed to be voted upon (see Martin 2002). Although these resolutions received only tiny percentages of “yes” votes (2.4 percent and 2.7 percent respectively),
Leon Sullivan, a civil rights activist, was subsequently appointed to GM’s Board of Directors.
These and other efforts raised awareness of the idea that by investing in a company, one was
indirectly supporting that company’s actions; this awareness fueled the SRI movement. In 1973,
ICCR was founded by a consortium of religious leaders whose goal was to use their power as
shareholders to influence companies’ actions (ICCR 2009). ICCR became a key player in the
efforts to render corporations more socially responsible, and its approximately 275 member organizations continue to file large numbers of shareholder resolutions yearly (Logsdon and Van
Buren 2008). ICCR provided the movement with a professional organization that has continued
to serve as a clearinghouse for ideas and strategies since its inception.
The anti-Apartheid movement proved crucial to the subsequent development of the movement. It brought institutional shareholders like foundations and educational institutions into the
field and expanded the tactical repertoire to include divestment. Between 1977 and 1989, about
18.5 percent of colleges and universities in the United States divested either partially or totally
from South Africa–related stocks and bonds (Soule 2009), and numerous pension funds and religious organizations divested from South African corporations (Massie 1997).

Socially Responsible Investing
Out of the ad hoc experimenting with social shareholder activism in the 1960s and 1970s, firms
emerged that sought to provide SRI for a profit. SRI takes nonfinancial issues into consideration
as one strategy for encouraging corporate social responsibility. The main strategy of these early
funds was screening out companies engaged in practices deemed unacceptable by the fund managers. Walden Asset Management, a division of Boston Trust, was founded in 1975, and Calvert
launched its Social Investment Fund in 1982. Over time, SRI firms broadened their work from
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screening out problematic companies to engaging with companies and filing shareholder
proposals.
Thus, alongside activists dedicated to a specific cause (e.g., antiwar, civil rights, anti-Apartheid), for whom shareholder activism was one tactic in a larger arsenal, the ICCR members, other
institutional investors—including (at least for awhile) some colleges and universities and pension funds—and SRI firms emerged as investors seeking to influence corporate practices more
generally and to allow interested parties to invest in ways that align more closely with their values. This distinction between “activists” and “investors” persists today (R17). This article is
concerned with the latter (investors), with a particular focus on for-profit SRI firms.
This brief history reveals three important things. First, in creating ICCR, the movement established an important institutional base. Second, new issues and new activists continually enter the
field, adding fresh ideas and creating new causes to be dealt with via investing (or divestment)
and shareholder activism. Finally, over time, the movement created numerous “lifers,” activists
that would establish careers in SRI and shareholder activism and continue to influence the field
for decades. We will discuss each of these in a later section. First, however, we briefly describe
the main strategies that currently comprise SRI and shareholder activism.

Shareholder Activism in the Twenty-First Century
Screening (investing in “good” companies)6 and divestment (selling off shares of companies
deemed socially irresponsible) were the primary tools of SRI firms in the 1970s and continues to
be used—socially responsible mutual funds, for example, typically do not include companies
engaging in specific businesses such as tobacco. However, divestment subsequently became less
popular (until very recently, as a fossil fuel divestment movement has gained steam). Today, in
addition to screening, SRI practitioners primarily use two main tools: shareholder resolutions
(proposals) and dialogue with companies.
Between 1999 and 2009, U.S. shareholders filed more than 3,000 shareholder resolutions on
environmental, social, and governance issues.7 Three hundred and forty-nine resolutions were
filed in 2012 (Welsh and Passoff 2012). Although some resolutions call for policy changes, most
make fairly modest demands, such as calling for companies to disclose information or review and
report on a specific issue. Resolutions are almost always nonbinding, and it is difficult to determine their overall impact or success (see, however, Lee and Lounsbury 2011). Although resolutions are garnering greater support from shareholders than in the past (see Welsh and Passoff
2012), most are voted down, and filers know that, but they believe the process may still contribute to the overall goal of pressuring the company to change its policy or practice by sparking a
dialogue with management or educating executives and board members about the issue in question. In addition, proposals occasionally garner publicity and can help bring an issue to the attention of the public. Our respondents repeatedly told us that resolutions were typically filed to raise
awareness about an issue and to initiate a dialogue with company leaders. As one SRI firm
employee (R10) explained, “The proposal is used as a leverage tool to begin dialogue. The proposal is a tool.” Thus, while the objectives of individual resolutions are necessarily narrow due
to SEC guidelines, the filer’s larger goals (e.g., education, dialogue with the company) are usually slightly different, and sometimes broader.
An important trend is that a higher percentage of shareholder resolutions are withdrawn than
in the past (Mathiasen 2013; R7), and withdrawal usually indicates that the targeted company has
agreed to negotiate with the resolution’s proponents. A dialogue may commence when a proposal
is withdrawn or, increasingly, at the request of shareholder advocates that a company has gotten
to know over time (R7). Only a small handful of studies have examined this dialogue process
(see, for example, Burchell and Cook 2006; Logsdon and Van Buren 2009; O’Rourke 2003),
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which can be difficult to study because both parties may prefer that the interaction remain
confidential.
The increasing prominence of dialogues as a change tactic is noteworthy because whereas
shareholder proposals are transparent, filed publicly and accessible to all, the dialogue process is
typically a private affair between company management and specific shareholders. This shift is
occurring in tandem with the growth of for-profit SRIs and other large institutional investors in
shareholder advocacy, and it raises concerns similar to those voiced by researchers studying the
marketization of other social and environmental causes. For example, in her study of Whole
Foods, Josée Johnston (2008:263) argues that privatizing social and environmental change efforts
“obscures many of the responsibilities of citizenship, and the associated tools of democratic
accountability, public regulation, and strong states to ensure that the commons are effectively
regulated, sustained, and equitably accessed over long time-frames.” In the case of shareholder
advocacy, favoring dialogues over resolutions may reduce public discussion and disenfranchise
other shareholders. In cases considered to be successful, however, the outcomes may be discussed and publicized among shareholder practitioners and occasionally the companies as well.
Some dialogues go on for years, with companies moving very slowly on advocates’ demands
(R12, R16). Laura Berry, Director of the ICCR, has stated, “Our time frame is eternity.”
The process of filing proposals and engaging in dialogues is now institutionalized and routinized. Regular filers know the SEC rules, and a number of lawyers specialize in advising shareholder activists (R13). What is more, consulting groups now provide information to companies
on how to manage proposals and dialogues (see, for example, Ernst & Young 2012). Most organizations that file regularly (SRI firms, pension funds, union groups, religious organizations, and
some social movement organizations (SMOs)) have paid staff in charge of shareholder proposals.
The process is, in general, less contentious than in the 1970s. And yet, the practices of shareholder activism and SRI are much wider spread than even a decade ago. The field is at a critical
moment of change.

Growth of For-profit SRI
According to the trade organization U.S. Social Investment Forum (US SIF 2013b), in 2012, SRI
assets totaled 3.74 trillion, up from 3.07 trillion in 2010. What is more, it is estimated that between
1995 and 2012 the SRI market increased 486 percent, “while the broader universe of assets under
professional management in the United States, according to estimates from Thomson Reuters
Nelson, has grown 376 percent” (US SIF 2013a). Part of this growth has to do with increasing
nonprofit endowment and pension fund investment. However, SRI investment firms undoubtedly
play a large role. A trend report by US SIF (2013b) explains that as of 2012, “there were 333
mutual fund products in the United States that consider environmental, social, or corporate governance (ESG) criteria, with assets of $640.5 billion. By contrast, there were just 55 SRI funds in
1995 with $12 billion in assets.” This growth is intensified by the entrance of larger financial
firms into the SRI field. For example, in April 2012, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney announced
that it would offer a “new investment platform designed to help clients align their financial goals
and their personal values.” The company press release stated, “The concept of integrating social
and environmental impact into investment decisions is not new, but its growing importance has
led to a greater opportunity set for investors” (Morgan 2012). Like Morgan Stanley Smith Barney,
numerous traditional investment firms and banks—including Bank of America and Deutsche
Bank—have created special funds focusing on SRI. However, most of these large investment
firms that now offer socially responsible, sustainable, impact or ESG investing do not file shareholder resolutions (R1). (And, ironically, shareholder resolutions are sometimes filed against
them by the more activist-oriented entities described above.)
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The older, smaller SRI firms emphasize that their portfolios are better screened and that they
are more active on behalf of their clients than firms offering SRI as one of many financial products/services. A research director for one of the smaller firms told us,
Bank of America will say “we can offer you a screened portfolio” and this is how we’ll do it—we
won’t put you in tobacco and we can look for the best environmental performers; but it could be
screens that are a little bit skin deep. So where if you go with one of the older firms [there’s a] higher
likelihood of getting companies in your portfolio that are really scrubbed with a finer, a more
discerning, eye. (R1)

Even without the participation of the larger companies (that typically do not file proposals), as
the SRI field has grown, SRI firms are filing a larger percentage of social shareholder proposals
than in the past. While religious organizations filed the most proposals in the decades following
the creation of the ICCR, over the past decade, SRI firms and pension funds have become comparatively more active. Paula Tkac’s (2006) study of proposals filed 1992–2002 describes the
beginning of this trend. While the total annual number of proposals submitted (an average of 257
per year) remained relatively stable during the period Tkac examined, there were notable changes
in the percentage of proposals filed by the different types of entities. Religious organizations
consistently filed the largest number of proposals each year during this period, but the filing pattern of SRI firms shifted dramatically, showing a sharp uptick beginning in 1999 (Tkac 2006).
Prior to that, SRI firms filed far fewer proposals than religious groups. Yet by 2012, SRI mutual
funds were lead filers on 27 percent of all social proposals. In 2013, they led 29 percent of filings,
followed by pension funds (26 percent) and religious organizations (18 percent; Welsh and
Passoff 2012, 2013). After decades of dominance by religious groups, shareholder activism is
increasingly enacted and led by for-profit SRI firms.

How Social Movement Logic Shapes SRI and Shareholder
Activism
All actors considering themselves primarily “investors” (those who seek to better align their
values with a desire for profit, that is, SRI firms, ICCR members, pension funds, certain NGOs)
experience tensions between social justice ideals and profits. However, as for-profit firms become
larger and more prevalent, questions about how to balance social justice with money making are
increasingly relevant. For years, small SRI firms have sought to bridge these logics. What happens as these two logics collide? How do these different logics shape ideas and practices? There
are at least three important ways social justice logic shapes current ideas and practices, including
(1) the continued role of ICCR and other nonprofit organizations, in providing education and
facilitating networking; (2) ongoing interactions between shareholder advocates, social movement activists, and NGOs; and (3) ideals of the key practitioners or “lifers” (gained or/and reinforced through their experiences in social justice activism).

Role of the ICCR and Other Nonprofit Organizations
Movement-associated actors created important organizations that have influenced the development of responsible investing. One such organization, the Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility (ICCR), has grown and professionalized over the years; it provides a key mechanism through which the social justice and environmental concerns of the early movement continue to structure practices of the smaller SRI firms. An ICCR employee told us “ICCR puts
social justice first. . . . ICCR wants to be the conscience of big business” (R12). Another (R19)
explained, “ICCR is part of creating a structure, so that social justice and environmental sustainability are not forgotten.”
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ICCR provides a forum for education on current social and environmental issues. Its biannual
meetings bring together all types of shareholder advocates to network and learn about current
issues (R10, R17). The annual meeting attended by the first author (in 2009) included sessions on
issues such as child labor in Uzbek cotton production, hydraulic fracturing, predatory lending,
and health care reform. Sessions included a mix of information sharing and strategizing. In some
cases, invited speakers gave informational presentations. Because some SRI firms are ICCR
members, representatives from those firms attend these gatherings and thus keep abreast of current social justice issues. One practitioner put it this way: “The genius of ICCR . . . is that they
build a common cause with that activist in Louisiana to raise issues about chemical pollution and
the effect on the community by a company” (R17).
ICCR also serves a networking function. At least 14 SRI firms are members of ICCR, and
numerous people in the for-profit world of SRI have strong connections to the organization.
Representatives from many of the approximately 300 ICCR member organizations meet regularly to share information and work together. One SRI firm employee (R10) told us,
If I don’t have experience with one company—if I don’t know the company culture—I can call Tim
Smith [former ICCR Director] or someone and they’ll say “oh no, you don’t have to file a proposal
with them—they’ll talk, give so-and-so a call.”

Most of the practitioners we interviewed remarked on the amount of collaboration between
various organizations. A respondent (R10) explained that, “anybody who has been doing SRI for
more than 10 years has worked with ICCR.” Early on, ICCR developed a model whereby two or
more entities, one of them the lead filer, submit resolutions jointly. “Everyone uses [the] ICCR
model, which includes the idea of a lead filer with a coalition behind that leader” (R10). The
model of a lead filer cofiling with other entities enables organizations to magnify their voice
(R15). A representative from a religious organization told us it was helpful to partner with forprofit SRI firms as they have more research capacity (R9). Public pension funds and labor funds
also coordinate with ICCR (R10). Such networking and cofiling may temper the logic of markets
and profit for those involved in for-profit SRI.
In addition to ICCR, other nonprofit organizations constitute an institutional infrastructure for
SRI firms and other investors. The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US
SIF—formerly the Social Investment Forum), cofounded in 1984 by Joan Bavaria, does research
and provides information, education, and networking opportunities. Meanwhile, newer, more
specialized organizations continue to be created to bring socially conscious investors together to
learn about and work on social, environmental, and/or governance-related issues. Ceres (which
some ICCR members and employees helped to create) provides a forum for investors interested
in environment-related issues. Other organizations include the Investor Environmental Health
Network, Investor Network on Climate Risk, and the Center for Political Accountability. These
nonprofit organizations serve functions similar to ICCR, including networking, coordination, and
education.

Ongoing Interactions with Social Movement Actors and NGOs
Shareholder activism/SRI continues to be shaped by its social movement/social justice history in
its connections to other social movements, NGOs, and foundations. A shareholder advocate at an
SRI firm (R1) explained,
. . . the core older group of practitioners—the smaller firms that have been at this for awhile . . . I
think that we’ve always worked to varying extents with NGOs that are working on various campaigns
. . . You’re seeing it now most recently with the fossil fuel divestment movement. There’s a great deal
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of interaction on worker issues in the developing world—labor conditions, supply chain issues,
factory conditions, Sudan divestment movement. Every few years there’s sort of a refreshing of
issues. We’re not insulated from broader social movements.

As this piece is being written, students around the United States are calling on their colleges
and universities to divest from fossil fuels. SRI firms engage with such activists. For example,
Bill McKibben, a well-known environmental activist who promotes fossil fuel divestment, was
one of the featured speakers at the annual meeting of US SIF in 2013.
Representatives from NGOs and progressive foundations regularly attend and speak at SRI
conferences. The 2012 and 2013 SRI Conferences, for example, featured participants from the
Environmental Defense Fund, Health Care without Harm, the National Congress of American
Indians, and the River Network. A respondent explained,
There are a variety of reasons why NGOs and SRI firms interact so much in conferences. In many
instances, the NGOs are issue experts drawn upon by SRI firms and coalitions. The NGOs have the
most depth of knowledge on many issues of concern to the SRI community. . . . Many SRI firms have
their own internal issue analysts, who are always hungry for more information to help them assess
corporate activities. NGOs often provide a balance to corporate perspectives presented at . . .
conferences as well as in dialogues. (R13)

Another reason NGO and SMO representatives attend SRI conferences is to inform practitioners about possible investment opportunities for their clients. A longtime SRI practitioner
explained, “Part of the purpose of SRI is to get nonprofits connected to money. They want clients
to learn about organizations that people could invest in and loan money to” (R22). Such organizations may be involved in a variety of efforts, such as the construction of low-income housing,
community economic development projects, or microlending.
Regular interaction with representatives from NGOs and other nonfinancial movement organizations helps practitioners stay informed of current struggles and keeps representatives of SRI
firms connected to current social justice and environmental work. The entry of new activists and
new causes serves to keep the SRI/shareholder activism community, including many (or even
most) of the for-profit players, grounded in social change work.

Ideals of Longtime Practitioners
A third way that social justice ideals continue to shape shareholder advocacy and SRI has to do
with the individuals who do this work. Some practitioners have a deep commitment to social
justice that was solidified through their participation in various activist causes (including but not
limited to antiwar, civil rights, and anti-Apartheid). A shareholder advocate for an SRI firm (R1)
explained, “I think there are a lot of people who are sort of lifers in this movement [for whom]
their first concern is social justice.” These “lifers” entered the field at different historical moments
and have attempted to meld deep concerns for social justice with investment.
In a 2012 article in Green Money Journal, Robert Zevin, Chairman of Zevin Asset Management,
describes the social justice work in which several shareholder activists and fund managers,
including Bob Schwartz (a Wall Street Investor), Tim Smith (Boston Trust), and Wayne Silby
(Founder of Calvert) engaged. Zevin writes,
. . . just about every colleague in the SRI movement of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s was a social
activist at the time they were bringing the same issues into their work as investment professionals and
as investors. And this was still very much the case in the 1980’s when Joan Bavaria and Amy Domini
brought their social commitments and multiple talents into the SRI community. (Zevin 2012)
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In interviews, SRI practitioners cited their concern with social justice as a strong motivator for
doing shareholder advocacy and SRI. An investment consultant told us, “We . . . got into this
because of anti-Apartheid. Now we want to get on board with McKibben’s plan to divest [from
fossil fuels]” (R22). Another (R1) explained that most of the longtime SRI practitioners are “concerned with curbing corporate overreach—or however you want to call the bad externalities that
corporations foist on society—environmental externalities or neglect or lack of corporate citizenship . . . .” Because they care deeply about social and environmental issues, they keep these
concerns front and center. Zevin’s concern is that this may fade as practitioners who do not have
the activist experiences or ideals enter the field. Our respondents had various takes on the future
of SRI and its social justice components. One (R14) worried that not only might the influence of
longtime SRI practitioners fade but that the ICCR members are aging and not being replaced.
This respondent also worried that there seems to be less activism in the country, in general, to
complement SRI and shareholder activism:
. . . it’s the aging of the Catholic clergy. ICCR is running out of steam . . . we were looking back at
photos from the 1970s and 1980s and the nuns . . . had just gotten out of their habits and their
religious clothes and some of them were in bell bottoms . . . and I’m looking at these and I’m thinking
“so where are the young religious people today to join this movement and give it energy?” It’s not
happening. [And] . . . look at college campuses today—I look at young people and think “why aren’t
you all in the streets? You’re turning into debt peons, we’re destroying the planet!”

Another of our interviewees (R1) was more hopeful, citing the entrance into SRI, and the business world more generally, of young people with new degrees in sustainable or socially responsible business:
. . . there are sustainable MBA programs and certificates that you can get now and a lot of the young
people get or already have their degrees from those programs. It’s so much better integrated into
some business school curriculums . . . I think they’re better equipped to . . . do the market research.
They’re trained in market research, in finance . . . I love the sophistication that they bring.

Thus, multiple cohort effects are at play in the shifting field of SRI/shareholder activism. As
the generation of social activists who founded the movement age, some have moved into forprofit SRIs even while maintaining their activist roots. However, a new generation of socially
responsible investors, raised in a different social climate, bring new sets of business skills to the
arena but may lack the social justice orientation of shareholder activism’s pioneers.

How Market Logic Shapes SRI and Shareholder Activism
How have the logics of investment and capital accumulation shaped shareholder activism and
SRI? Shareholder activists interact with businesses when they file resolutions, attend meetings,
and engage in dialogues with company leaders. Over the years, almost all have accommodated to
the culture and norms of business. Most practitioners we spoke with emphasized that they wanted
to be taken seriously by business leaders and not be thought of simply as troublemakers. One
practitioner (R2) explained, “We’re not radicals, we’re not trying to take the company down.”
This statement reflects a sentiment dominant among SRI practitioners and shareholder advocates. Although the shareholder activists of the 1960s and 1970s would almost certainly have
considered themselves “radical” or extremely progressive, the dominant stance currently is that
it is better to “fit in” to the business world and, to gain the ears of corporate leaders, only rock the
boat minimally.
We discuss two important ways in which the logic of business and finance currently shapes
shareholder advocacy/SRI. First, practitioners now consistently frame their demands in terms of
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the business case (arguing that social and environmental responsibilities contribute to the financial bottom line). Second, as more investors opt for SRI, and there is more competition among
firms, SRI companies feel increased pressure to show that their portfolios yield good financial
results.

Making the Business Case
Years of working with businesses taught shareholder advocates the efficacy of making “the business case.” Simply put, this means trying to convince businesses to make changes not out of
moral concerns but because the proposed changes will positively affect the financial bottom line.
One shareholder advocate (R2) explained, “Unfortunately morality doesn’t rule the day. You
have to cite the business case.” Another practitioner (R10) stated, “. . . we all use business case
language. You can’t just make the moral case, you have to explain the financial benefits . . . ” A
longtime shareholder advocate who currently works at an SRI firm (R17) described the transition
to business-case framing, explaining that, in the 1970s,
. . . we tended to speak moral language—of what was right and just. . . . In early years on issues like
South Africa or strip mining or whatever, we weren’t about the business case. We were about, “Stop
this abuse. End your complicity with Apartheid.” . . . One company even said to us it was ships
passing in the night. We’re talking about the social and moral issues and they’re talking about the
business realities and these were two worlds that didn’t intersect.

He recalled that a CEO once said to him, “You convinced me. But I’m representing the shareowners and, basically, we have to think of the business case together.” Today, according to this
practitioner, if the investment, financial, and business case is clear to large investors, they may in
fact support social, environment, or governance changes if they can be shown to be in the company’s business interest.8
However, there may be a serious potential downside to focusing too heavily on the business
case. Some of those we interviewed mentioned the importance of other (nonfinancial) types of
activism to complement SRI and shareholder activism. One respondent (R14) explained that to
create change:
. . . you need the social unrest. You need investors to say, “see those people out there? They’re coming
after you. . . .” [The anti-Apartheid movement] was at the point where celebrities, politicians,
grannies, ordinary people started lining up outside the South African embassy every day, day after
day, to get arrested. There was legislation pending in Congress forcing divestment. That came out of
the ground work laid by the investors, and mainly the faith-based investors, then it spread to the
college campuses and so on.

That level of activism could be generated, according to this respondent, because it was easy to
talk about the moral component of an issue like Apartheid. But the business case is different.
[O]nce you get into that complicated realm of economics . . . then you’re out into the weeds and the
nuance . . . it’s hard to use that as an organizing core for a social activist campaign. If I had to explain
to you why there’s a risk to a coal company or a utility that’s heavily dependent on coal, I have to go
through a pretty long analysis that most people will get lost in by the third sentence. (R14)

Whatever the strategic pros and cons of business-case framing may be, in the case of longtime
SRI practioners, adopting business-case language seems in no way to have diminished their commitment to social justice (although it is certainly possible that some issues could be dropped from
their agendas if a business case for them cannot be made). Also, many practitioners are convinced
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that it is in fact in a company’s long-term financial interest to adopt policies that are worker- and
environment-friendly. A respondent (R17) explained,
What’s changed a lot [is that] now whoever the sponsor or the advocate is of these issues is, we do
speak the business case and it’s not just an artifact, it’s not just an artificial way of doing it—we can
speak the business case and we can be convincing to other investors and to companies.

That same respondent gave an example of how the business-case frame has contributed to
important changes in the field:
A perfect example of this creative tension is the proxy voting service ISS [Institutional Shareholder
Services].9 ISS is only going to vote for something if it is convinced that it’s in the long-term financial
interests of the company. In the early days . . . they voted against everything . . . [Then] they began
to understand the broader context of these discussions. They are now voting much more creatively
and actively and supportively on many of these issues, but their criteria for voting is still if it is in the
financial interest of the company. (R17)

Profits and Benchmarks
As for-profit entities, SRI firms need to make a profit by showing a good return on the investments of their clients. One of our respondents (R5) explained that in SRI, “there’s a mix of ideals
and marketing. . . . Everyone at some point has to say they will make money.” This is the fundamental tension to which we have called attention, as externalizing costs onto workers and the
environment creates profits for firms. On top of this, as more firms enter the field and SRI investing becomes increasingly mainstream, SRI companies may feel the need to show that they are
competitive compared with others offering similar products or even compared with non-SRI
companies. Firms often seek to show that their returns are competitive by trying to meet benchmarks such as the S&P 500 (see Hawken 2004). Achieving such returns may require holding
companies that are less than ideal from an SRI perspective (R1). The desire to hold shares in
profitable companies of all ilk may be one reason that divestment has largely fallen out of favor,
while use of “engagement” (filing shareholder proposals, entering into dialogs) has flourished.
An SRI practitioner told us, “If you talk to people in the SRI movement today, they do not want
to hear about divestment because that means they have less product to sell” (R14). Instead,
according to this respondent, firms would rather hold shares in potentially profitable companies
and engage with those companies.
As SRI firms compete for clients, shareholder activism can become a product that distinguishes firms and “adds value.” Paula Tkac (2006:7) speculates that the growth in shareholder
activism by SRI firms beginning around 1999 “coincides with the bear market of 2000–2002.
Socially responsible mutual funds may have turned to activism as a way to add value for investors when the return performance on the portfolios suffered.” If Tkac is correct, this would be an
example of how marketization shapes this practice. She believes the rise in the percentage of
resolutions filed by SR mutual funds since 1999 is noteworthy. Socially responsible mutual funds
have a diverse strategy, splitting their proposal activity more evenly than pension funds across
environmental issues, antidiscrimination, international conduct, and food/agriculture. Implicit in
their choice of activism issues and targets is, of course, the motivation to invest in firms that are likely
to perform well. (Tkac 2006:10)

Business scholar Arturo Salazar (2007) argues that mutual funds file shareholder resolutions
to gain trust of their clients—because, in fact, they invest in many companies that engage in
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practices of which their clients would not approve. Filing resolutions is a public act firms may
use to indicate to clients they are socially responsible. Taken to an extreme, a focus on engagement in the absence of negative screens would allow SRI firms to invest in almost any company,
the rationale being that the SRI firm will then “engage” with that company. This may in fact be
what is often happening. In a study of SRI mutual funds around the world, Paul Hawken
(2004:16–17) found that “[t]he screening methodologies and exceptions employed by most SRI
mutual funds allow practically any publicly held company to be considered as an SRI portfolio
company.” As for-profit firms take up more space in the field of responsible investing, it stands
to reason that profits and competitive returns will be increasingly important and will sometimes
trump social justice ideals.

Discussion and Conclusion
For its pioneers, social shareholder activism was a means to social justice ends. SRI firms and
other organizations then sought to blend social justice and profit. Today, as larger, diversified
firms enter the SRI market, social and environmental issues become a means to financial profit
ends.
We have focused mainly on how the older, smaller for-profit SRI firms voluntarily operate at
the intersection of two logics. Greenwood et al. (2011:352) suggest exploring whether “organizations experiencing enduring and stable institutional complexity” (which derives from multiple
and incompatible logics) “develop blended hybrid arrangements that, over time, become institutionalized within organizations and thus uncontested settlements . . . or, whether there is ongoing
tension and contestation and continual reflexivity . . . .” SRI firms are hybrid entities similar to
the for-profit microlending organizations described by Battilana and Dorado (2010). These firms
helped create a new way to think about investing—a new way to calculate risk—that involves
considering social and environmental criteria. This is a hybrid arrangement that is almost uncontested in SRI firms. But these organizations are far from settled or static.
Practitioners engage in reflexivity about their practices, questioning, for example, the future
of the industry (as indicated by Robert Zevin’s presentation quoted in the opening paragraph of
this article), continually assessing and reassessing progress and strategies, and constantly evolving new frames (e.g., from “SRI” to “ESG” to “Impact” investing—R22). Almost all our respondents alluded to tensions created by competing logics. The tension manifests between shareholder
activists and the companies they target, between SRI investors and other organizations in the
field (such as proxy-voting services), and even between practitioners themselves.
These tensions play out regularly. As allowed by SEC rules, companies regularly omit social
shareholder resolutions from proxy ballots when possible (see Welsh and Passoff 2013). If companies engage in dialogues with shareholder activists, it can be quite challenging to reach agreements (R7, R8, R9, R15). A respondent described tensions internal to SRI organizations and the
field of SRI as a whole:
. . . there’s a tension between those who got into this from the social activism end, for whom
investment was leveraged to accomplish social activism—people who care about environment,
human rights, labor rights—and [those more interested in profit]. I won’t call it a fault line but there’s
a tension within the SRI movement over that. (R14)

Most practitioners at SRI firms choose to operate at the intersection of competing logics. They
want to hear from activists and want to engage with companies in dialogues, although the task of
incorporating both logics into a coherent set of ideas and practices is challenging. Willingness to
position themselves in this uncomfortable space has allowed many smaller SRI firms to balance
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and incorporate competing logics. It is precisely the tension between the social justice logic and
the logic of capital accumulation that has led to innovations in how to think about and perform
responsible investing.
However, to grow as an industry, SRI has to show profits to attract more investors, who may
want to be socially responsible but who also want good returns. As SRI grows—and it is growing fast—will it be able to persist in combining both logics to the extent that it has typically
done thus far? Interestingly, the pull of both social justice and market logics may be intensifying. From the business side, there is more competitive pressure as more firms offer SRI/ESG
options. From the social and environmental justice side, there is more information available,
and clients have higher expectations of SRI funds than in the past. A longtime practitioner (R1)
told us that as SRI has become more sophisticated, she feels the tensions between the competing
logics more intensely.
I think the standards for companies to be in an SRI portfolio have risen a lot over the years because
the tools to analyze and think about corporate responsibility have become more sophisticated and
also social expectations—society wide—have risen. When I first started doing this in the early 1990s
you’d look at a large company and there were just a handful of screens . . . [and] . . . except in really
exceptional cases you weren’t looking too closely . . . [For example] the environmental standards
have risen dramatically . . . it’s not just how low, how small, is a company’s own operational footprint,
it’s the footprint of their suppliers, it’s their environmental footprint, it’s their lobbying profile . . .
we’re measuring a broader set of criteria [now].

Shareholder activist Robert Zevin has stated,
SRI will continue to grow in its share of total invested money in the US and in the world. . . . As
it penetrates more conventional financial institutions, it may well be diluted in various ways,
which is why it is so important to keep the primary focus on the achievement of social change
rather than moral purity or investment returns, as desirable as they may also be. (Quoted in Baue
2004)

As noted above, research has shown that when the competing logics of social justice and market intersect, market and profit logic typically dominates. Daniel Nyberg and Christopher
Wright (2013) describe how sustainability managers in large companies must constantly negotiate compromises. Like SRI practitioners, sustainability managers often use business-case language to justify environmental protections. At other times, however, they accept or articulate a
concept of sustainability that is less about environmental concerns and more about sustainability of the business. Yet, with marketization or corporatization of social change efforts (whether
it is organics, fair trade, or responsible investing), some aspects (even if in weaker forms) of
social and environmental justice ideas and practices may persist even in the marketized or corporatized forms.
As practiced by the older for-profit SRI firms, SRI/shareholder advocacy continues to be partially shaped by the institutions and ideals developed throughout its history as a movement to rein
in corporate power. Shareholder activists concerned with social and environmental issues have
created new ways of thinking about investments, such as using financial capital to “do good”
when possible, refusing to invest in companies engaging in activities deemed particularly egregious, or/and raising awareness and seeking policy changes on issues deemed problematic. In
doing so, they have created both a market for products and services they developed and a hybrid
institutional form—investment firms that consider both the financial bottom line as well as
social, environmental, and corporate governance issues. The reframing of SRI as “ESG” investing (the argument that taking social, environmental, and governance issues into account is good
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for the financial bottom line) has allowed institutions with fiduciary responsibility, such as
pension funds, to take social and environmental issues into consideration and participate as
shareholder activists. One respondent explained, “This is a movement that’s in the process of
recreating financial analysis” (R14). However, as this hybrid form of financial analysis gains
traction, the movement may risk co-optation by corporate entities, as Jaffee and Howard (2010)
describe in the case of organics and fair trade.
Corporations and financial institutions operate under a logic of profit in the interest of shareholder value, measured in financial terms. SRI practitioners have not fundamentally altered this
logic. However, they have influenced the way financial risk is conceptualized and calculated
among an ever-growing set of investors. In addition, they put companies on alert that their practices may be publicly questioned or challenged.
Most of the respondents with whom we spoke had few illusions that their efforts were sufficient to create the magnitude of social and environmental change to which they ultimately
aspire. They understand their work to be part of a larger set of efforts that include on-theground activism, work by social movement organizations and NGOs, and, ideally, governmental oversight and regulation. However, neoliberal ideology has resulted in governmental
retraction, and some SRI advocates question the efficacy of responsible investing alone—without the possibility or the threat of government action. A longtime practitioner at an SRI firm
stated,
I’m not sure investors, as investors, are going to be able to make the societal change that’s necessary
to protect Planet Earth from the kind of environmental destruction we’re facing. And yet if people
define themselves that way it’s the only way you’re going to get them to play. You can’t get them out
of that space and invite them to be part of a social movement. (R17)

Our research calls attention to ways in which social movements may develop over time. Just
as they may be professionalized, institutionalized, and sometimes co-opted, movements may also
turn into “hybrid” for-profit businesses even while continuing to seek social change. As has been
the case (at least to some extent) with fair trade and organic agriculture, some movement practices have the potential to become for-profit endeavors. We have pointed to the tensions that
emerge from such transformations and examined how social change ideas and practices shape or
are reshaped by for-profit logic.
Although we have sought to show how social justice ideas and practices have been maintained
in a very particular for-profit arena, we do not mean to imply that market solutions are inevitable
or desirable, as they tend to depoliticize issues by removing them from democratic processes (see
Johnston 2008; Soederberg 2009). For example, we explained how the move toward using dialogue, which typically happens behind closed doors, reduces the possibility of public oversight
of the shareholder advocacy process.
Pache and Santos (2010) note that there are representatives of logics within organizations and
that some have more power than others, leading to a prioritization of logics. This question of how
logics of profit and justice get prioritized in small SRI firms as they compete with larger players
(Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and others), and also how both logics manifest (if at all) in the
large, diversified firms that now offer ESG products, would be an interesting avenue for further
research. Future research also might investigate the role of professional degree programs, such as
sustainable MBAs, in creating and maintaining “hybrid” frames such as ESG investing. As social
movements are increasingly marketized and corporatized, it is important to continue to study
how competing logics operate. We hope researchers will continue to investigate both the power
of market logic and how progressive ideals and practices—social justice logics—may persist in
for-profit organizations.
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Appendix
Description of Respondents.
Respondent
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22

Description
Shareholder Advocate, SRI Firm
Shareholder Advocate, Religious
ICCR Staff Member
Shareholder Advocate, SMO
Shareholder Rights Volunteer
Director, Shareholder Advocate Organization
Researcher, NGO
Corporate Secretary
Shareholder Advocate, Religious
Legal Counsel, SRI Firm
Shareholder Rights Volunteer
ICCR Staff Member
Legal Counsel, Independent
Consultant, NGO
Shareholder Advocate, SRI Firm
ICCR Staff Member
Shareholder Advocate, SRI Firm
Consultant, Nonprofit Organization
ICCR Staff Member
Independent Shareholder Activist
Consultant, Affiliate of Academic Institute
Investment Consultant, SRI Firm

Note. SRI = socially responsible investing; ICCR = Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility.
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Notes
1.
2.

SRI typically stands for “socially responsible investing”—the conference, however, rebranded SRI as
“sustainable, responsible, impact investing.”
And see Michael Lounsbury, Marc Ventresca, and Paul M. Hirsch (2003) and Hayagreeva Rao (2009)
on how social movements play a role in the creation (or inhibition) of markets.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.
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Social and environmental issues with which shareholder activists are typically concerned include labor
and human rights, political spending, climate change, natural resource management, and environmental toxins (Welsh and Passoff 2012).
We use the term hybrid in two ways. First, most of the older and smaller SRI firms are “hybrids” in
that they seek to bridge two competing logics, similar to the hybrid (for-profit) microlending firms
described by Battilana and Dorado (2010). Second, we refer to a hybrid form of investing that incorporates social and environmental issues and corporate governance into analyses of companies’ risk and
long-term profit potential.
The first author attended a weeklong annual meeting of the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility (ICCR) in 2009, two student conferences on responsible investing (Responsible
Endowment Coalition—Spring 2008 and Spring 2009), and two trade conferences (“Integrating ESG,”
June 2009, and the SRI Conference, October 2012). These conferences were selected to provide insight
into the different positions in the “SRI” field, as such positions affect perceptions and action (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 1992; Fligstein and McAdam 2011).
While positive screening involves seeking out companies that are socially and environmentally responsible, negative screening is similar to divestment, in that it entails not holding shares of companies
deemed irresponsible.
What constitutes “social, environmental, and governance” is somewhat subjective and different organizations collecting information on resolutions sometimes have slightly different numbers.
“Business case” framing has been especially important in that it has allowed organizations that have a
fiduciary responsibility—such as pension funds—to become active shareholder advocates. Large pension funds such as the California Public Employees Pension System or the New York City Employees
Retirement System (NYCERS) now routinely file shareholder resolutions and engage in dialogues
with companies on social and environment-related issues (see Welsh and Passoff 2013). This is possible because these funds can make the argument that their requested changes are in the best financial
interest of their members. Thus, for example, in the early 1990s, NYCERS was able to be an active
participant in a successful campaign to bar sexual orientation discrimination at Cracker Barrel. The
pension fund and other shareholder activists could claim that sexual orientation discrimination was
ultimately bad for business and the bottom line.
ISS is a service for institutional shareholders that offers analysis of companies and advice on how to
vote on proxy ballots.
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